Whither the 'new generation' of African leadership?

When I read that Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi was considering stepping down after the next elections in 2010, I couldn’t help remembering the Clinton administration’s ‘New Generation’ of African leaders: Meles, Eritrean President Isayas Afeworki, Rwandan President Paul Kagame, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and Congolese warlord-turned-president Laurent Kabila.

All of these leaders had come to power through the violent overthrow of existing regimes in their countries, which made the Clinton administration’s characterization particularly odd at the time. Nevertheless, they did at least appear to be open to democratization, which is probably more where the administration was coming from. Certainly in the case of Ethiopia, Eritrea and the DRC, the new regimes appeared a vast improvement on the dictatorships they’d overthrown.

Ten years or so later, they’re all still in power (barring Kabila, whose son Joseph replaced him upon his assassination in 2001 and is still in power):

• Museveni, who has been in power since 1986 and whose inclusion in the original list of ‘new’ leaders was slightly incongruous anyway, has cleared the way for his pursuit of a third elected term, and will probably win the 2011 election (barring his death — he’ll be 65 this year).
• Kagame is firmly in control of Rwanda’s politics, and shows no signs of leaving power anytime soon. Political space is fairly well controlled by the regime.
• Isayas has tightened his grip, and no elections or other transfer of power are in prospect for the foreseeable future. His regime has sponsored rebels in Ethiopia, funded factions in Somalia’s conflict and even picked a fight with Djibouti over their border.

If Meles leads the way and steps down, will it be the beginning of a trend in the region? I’m not optimistic.

Even if it did, the trend wouldn’t necessarily be a welcome one. First of all, Meles isn’t talking about completely leaving power: he’s mooted staying on as leader of the EPRDF, but allowing a successor to take over as PM. Moreover, although the regime has certainly delivered on some developmental goals — especially in terms of physical infrastructure — political space remains severely constrained. Opposition parties barely registered in the April 2008 local elections, after the ruling party came back with a strong response to the challenge it faced in the 2005 general elections (when opposition parties expanded their parliamentary representation from 12 to nearly 200 seats). The leaders of oppsition parties have been jailed recently. The government also recently passed a law restricting ‘foreign’ NGOs from working in areas considered politically sensitive, including women’s and children’s rights and conflict resolution. ‘Foreign NGOs’ are now defined as any which receive more than 10% of funding from abroad, a very low threshold.

Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda have definitely seen some economic development during the past ten years, although the same can’t be said of the DRC and Eritrea. The global economic downturn will prove a serious challenge to all these governments, in terms of maintaining that growth. These and other leaders may now find themselves facing the consequences of not opening political freedoms apace during the boom years, in terms of increased social unrest during the economic squeeze.

Hope or despair in the Niger Delta

Having spent the past three days around the table with a small group of people in Abuja, all of whom are dedicated to improving life on the ground in a tangible way for the communities of the Niger Delta, I was startled to discover myself on the opposite end of the spectrum from one of my colleagues on the outlook for the Delta region. Specifically, I felt we disagreed on the prospects for meaningful change under the current federal administration.

My colleague, who has periodic interaction with ministerial contacts in Abuja, has over the last year got the sense that government folks are serious about change, and about improving the Delta. As such, it is not fair to paint them with the same brush as the preceding administrations. In essence, my colleague has taken the risk to feel optimistic. Perhaps cautiously optimistic, but optimistic nonetheless.

For myself, I don't see it. The current administration has failed miserably to make any headway since coming to office in May 2007. President Yar'Adua, in order to recover from the massive and blatant electoral fraud which characterised the elections and destroyed his legitimacy, needed to make progress on two key issues that matter to the citizens. First, the government needed to make quick visible progress on the provision of electricity. However, the government has not only failed to improve on the situation it inherited last year, but in fact has overseen the further deterioration of the network. For a country swimming in oil revenues, for electricity generation to have plummeted from about 2000MW to under 900MW at one point this year is unacceptable. People all over the country are outraged, and justifiably so -- especially when the government appears more focused on ferreting out misuse of funds spent on this issue under the previous administration than on tackling the issue themselves.

The second issue was to deliver results on peace and security in the Niger Delta. After choosing a running mate from the Niger Delta, in a clear attempt to demonstrate commitment to the issue, Yar'Adua has made no headway. His initiative to organise a Niger Delta summit had already fundamentally failed by the end of 2007. During the first few months of 2008, it looked increasingly like the summit would simply be another talking shop for the familiar faces, and not even including all the stakeholders. By the middle of this year, the process was abandoned, after a controversial figure (Ibrahim Gambari, recently a UN special representative to Burma, but associated with the atrocities in the Delta region under the Abacha regime) was chosen to chair the summit. Yar'Adua appears now to have pulled back, and is considering his options for engagement with the region. Worse, he's managed to evoke a commitment from the UK for security cooperation in the region, which was widely interpreted in the region as evidence that London prioritises the security of the region's oil over the livelihoods and development of its people.

For those of us committed to promoting positive change, this situation presents a strong challenge. On the grassroots level, there is evidence of change. The board meeting which brought me to the region was for Stakeholder Democracy Network, an organisation that is making a difference on a small scale at a very local level. That in itself is reason to hope. But compared to the scale of the problem, it also makes clear the enormity of the challenge. I fear it won't be anytime soon that we can hang up our tools and congratulate ourselves on a job well done.

Nevertheless, it's worth the effort. The struggle is to maintain realism, without yielding to cynicism -- a challenge almost as daunting as the project itself.

Developmental authoritarianism?

Fairly far below the radar in most of the world, a new chapter has opened in a lingering dispute between France and Rwanda. Amid the controversy surrounding potentially underage Chinese Olympic gymnasts and the fears that Russia's smackdown in Georgia signals a shift in Moscow's foreign policy, Kigali and Paris have resumed the battle for the dominant narrative surrounding the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Neither side is promoting an accurate historical narrative, rather one that suits their interests and agenda.

In France, as noted today by Stephen Kinzer in an op-ed in the International Herald Tribune, the government has so far refused to accept, and does not appear ready to, real responsibility for its support of the Hutu power government that organised and implemented the genocide. Nor has it accepted responsibility for the role its troops played by - in effect - providing rearguard cover to the fleeing genocidaires, who escaped into neighbouring Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo) alongside genuine refugees, and remain to this day. The indirect effects of 'Operation Turquoise' are still felt in the eastern Congo, where political instability fueled in part by pro-Rwandan militia keeps hundreds of thousands of displaced.

However, for President Paul Kagame of Rwanda, it is essential that his regime continues to portray itself as the saviour of Rwanda - and, crucially, for its portrayal to be accepted in the West. In Kigali's narrative, Kagame's rebel forces, the ethnically Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front/Army, brought an end to the genocide and the regime which orchestrated it, in 1994. Afterwards, they brought democracy and economic development, and an end to ethnic politics. Crucially, the West is the bad guy in this narrative: in the case of the US and UN, for having failed to intervene and save the hundreds of thousands Tutsi, Twa and others; in the case of France, for complicity in the genocide itself.

Both narratives seriously distort the truth. However, by focusing on the denialism of France, and portraying the dispute between Kagame and the French as a David and Goliath story, whereby a tiny, impoverished African nation finally holds a meddling former colonial power to account, Kinzer and others find themselves drawn into Kagame's own revisionist narrative. Wittingly or otherwise, this draws attention away from an important dynamic, and suits Kagame's interests.

In a report released on August 5, the Rwandan government accused senior French government and military officials of varying degrees of responsibility for the genocide, including former President Mitterand. Rather than as an attempt to hold France to account (noises from Kigali suggest they may seek to prosecute French officials, perhaps at the International Criminal Court), the report should be seen as Rwanda's response to French (and Spanish) investigations which have found senior figures within Rwanda's regime (including Kagame himself) to have been complicit in the assassination of President Juvenal Habyarimana. The downing of Habyarimana's plane, which also carried the Burundian president, was the spark that triggered the 100-day genocide.

Kagame can not let this stand, for the notion that his actions triggered the genocide seriously undermines his claims to have saved the country by expelling the genocidal regime. Allegations that his rebels carried out reprisal attacks as they took control of the country also erode their shining image as saviours. This is important, because having 'saved the country' forms the foundation of the regime's legitimacy, upon which Kagame has built an agenda for economic growth and diversification, developing a reputation for prudent economic management along the way. The West must remain guilt-ridden for its failure to intervene, as this allows Kagame a free hand on issues such as democracy and human rights.

This is part of a wider and more significant dynamic, between developing countries and the West. Post-revolutionary regimes in Africa and elsewhere are seeking to benefit from China's example of economic growth and poverty reduction in a context of political authoritarianism. In contrast to the agenda promoted under the 'Washington consensus', China has demonstrated that it is possible for a police state with an appalling human rights record to deliver on developmental goals. Kagame is not alone is pursuing a similar model: Ethiopia, Uganda, Gabon and Angola are all led by former military movements, now investing heavily in infrastructure in order to promote growth - as long as there is no challenge to the regime.

This has important implications for Western engagement with the region. It is no longer taken as a given that democratisation and development are linked, and while China and other emerging 'powers' may not be challenging the West's role as lead donor, they are challenging the assumptions underlying Western developmental models. This means that it is more important than ever that Western governments develop a more nuanced understanding of Africa's reality, in order to design a policy response that gains traction in the region. Delivering on economic development is crucial, and given the crushing levels of poverty in the region, one might be forgiven for prioritising it over political openness. However, in the medium to long term, both political and economic freedom will be needed to deliver overall security.

Ten years after

On August 7, 1998, the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania were attacked in twin suicide truck bombings by al-Qaida militants, killing over 200 and wounding thousands -- almost all of them Africans.

At the time of the attacks, I was serving as a Peace Corps Volunteer in Ethiopia. On that day, I happened to be in Nairobi on holiday. When the attackers detonated their explosives, I had been on my way to the embassy, but stopped to check on a friend a few blocks away at the dentist. Several floors up in one of downtown Nairobi's tall office buildings, we felt the air rush out of the windows, then heard and felt the blast. Wondering what had happened, I went into the hallway -- someone said something about a grenade in the lobby.

There was no smoke, or other indication of a problem in our building. My friend, who with the dentist had also popped into the hallway, went back to their dental activity. I joined a flow of people who were heading down the stairs, in order to find out more about what was going on.

I went as far as the corner, and could see the smoke rising from where the embassy had been attacked. People were milling about, including some who had come from the direction of the attack. A man stumbled by on the other side of the street, covered in blood from the cuts he had received when the glass from shattered windows had fallen on him.

I decided to return to the dentist's office to collect my friend. Together, we made our way to the Peace Corps office, where on Kenyan national television we saw footage of the devastation: the embassy destroyed, along with much of two neighboring buildings, one of which hosted significant Kenyan telecommunications infrastructure -- cutting the country off from international connections. The cameras did not spare the viewer: blasted matatus and passenger vehicles, burned occupants crammed inside, jammed the street beside the embassy.

Later, I would come to learn that al-Qaida had been considering coordinated attacks not only in Kenya and Tanzania, but also in Ethiopia, Uganda and Eritrea. Osama bin Laden had until recently been resident in Sudan, but expelled under US pressure. I could not - and still struggle to - comprehend that taking a dozen US lives was worth killing hundreds of African bystanders, who presumably had no involvement in US policy or action. The next day, I and the other Ethiopian program volunteers were flown back to Addis Ababa, to return to our posts.

Ten years later, having returned to the US and tried my hand at software development, I now scrutinize the Horn of Africa on a daily basis, as a political and economic analyst in Oxford. A significant part of the motivation which saw me move to London for post-graduate study in African politics, history and economics was a desire to influence US policy in the region.

Having escaped the attacks in Kenya, I have since experienced the September 11, 2001 attacks while living in DC, and the July 7, 2005 attacks in London. It baffles me that, ten years later, we have not yet found a successful strategy for dealing with al-Qaida's hate driven extremism, instead pursuing adventurist policies in Iraq, and what my friend Colin describes as a 'Whac-a-mole' policy of targeted assassination in Somalia. The US desperately needs to re-evaluate years of failed strategies, particularly in the Horn of Africa, where multiple and interlinked conflicts threaten the lives and livelihoods of millions of people.

Ten years later, the US has failed to learn the lessons of the US embassy attacks. Perhaps under a new administration, next year we can begin to undo the damage.

Post-poll blues

November 18, 2004 - It's been a rough couple of weeks. Although I'm happy to have been able to make it home in time to vote, I'm really tired of not being represented in Washington by politicians who have the same values as me.

My personal opinion is that the media has been making too much of this idea that the election outcome was a clear statement about 'values'. In this story, by reelecting George Bush Americans have sent a signal that 'values' are at the center of their political concerns. In the story, Republicans have found a way to capitalize on those concerns while Democrats are perceived as not being strong on 'values'. This has given a second Bush administration a mandate.

I just wanted to bring up two ideas in contrast to this narrative, because I don't feel that it does the situation justice.

First, let's consider the notion that this election outcome has somehow given Bush a mandate for a second administration. This was a record setting election. The Bush campaign was quick to claim that he'd received the most votes for President in history. What they don't talk about is how Kerry received the second-most in history, and thus this election also produced the highest number of votes against an incumbent president. What this suggests to me is a country that is divided. A 52%-48% split is not a mandate. When Ronald Reagan crushed Walter Mondale 59%-40% in 1986, that produced a what could be called a mandate. What the election in 2004 produced was record turnout because voters were energized on both sides of the fence.

The second thing I wanted to bring up was the world view that voters in different camps brought to the ballot box. While all the attention has been on 'values', what seems to be getting overlooked is that many people who voted for Bush have a mistaken view of reality, both in terms of the facts on the ground and their understanding of where Bush stands on issues. Rather than go into every detail, I'll point you to the results of a recent poll by the Program on International Policy Attitudes & Knowledge Networks. Some of the most significant findings are that a majority of Bush supporters believe that Iraq had WMD or a major program to develop them. They also believe that this is what the Bush administration has been saying - a source of agreement between Bush and Kerry supporters. The difference is that Kerry supporters see this as misleading. The poll results showed that Bush supporters also tend to hold incorrect beliefs about the administration's position on other policy issues, such as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban treaty, the International Criminal Court, and the Kyoto Protocol.

Since the poll focused on international policy, we can only speculate on whether this trend extends to domestic issues. When I try to make sense of the election, I find myself forced to conclude that it must be the case. Whatever dramatic impact Karl Rove's mobilization of the conservative Christian base had on the election, those people did not amount to the majority of Bush supporters, let alone of the nation's voting public. While the media focuses on 'values', certainly an important issue with a key target voting block, the fact that Bush's supporters appear to be misinformed gets overlooked as a plausible reason for Bush's election victory.

Perhaps I'm too optimistic about my fellow citizens. I've been told as much. But I'd prefer to believe that Bush's supporters are misinformed than that they hold the same intolerant views and 'values' that he and his administration espouse. Real tolerance is not the legislation of one's own values and the subsequent forcing of other's to adhere to them. Real freedom and tolerance, as protected by the (current) constitution, requires that we tolerate not only that which is comfortable and popular, but "opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death." That's the way Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes described how we needed to understand our First Amendment rights. While this has extreme implications, I believe what it protects vastly outweighs the potential offensiveness almost all the time. I just hope the country (and planet) can survive four more years of assault on the things that make the US a great place to live. I fear a culture of intolerance and extremism is rising up to combat threats to our national security.

Developmental state

June 9, 2004 - Well, it's been awhile. I've been thinking a lot lately about the discrepancy between the wealthiest and the poor in the world and finding it ever more intolerable. Without going freshman-year-Marxist on anyone, I'll expound for a moment.

I read an editorial by Jeff Sachs in yesterday's International Herald Tribune that dealt with the problems caused by the U.S. having a lack of poverty and development expertise in places where they could make a difference, even within USAID. It touched a nerve with me, because I've been struggling to articulate something related for a few weeks. The gap between the world's poor and the wealthy seems to be widening, with poor people in places like sub-Saharan Africa just being left behind. The Washington-dominated development efforts of the Bretton Woods institutions continue to focus on economic growth as the sole solution to improving the lives of the world's poorest. And yet, after more than 20 years of BWI-led intervention in many countries, conditions for many people continue to deteriorate. It just makes me tired.

My opinion, still developing, is that more is required than loans and conditionalities. It is unacceptable for some people to live in stable conditions (or worse, be growing obese as a culture) while most people live in terrible conditions. Being from the United States, I feel particularly awful about how much my fairly effortless existence has been facilitated by the suffering of others. The US may be the largest dollar-amount donor in terms of development, but as a proportion of GDP, our contribution is shamefully low. While better, the EU & Japan are also not doing enough. My fantasy solution for this problem is in two basic parts. The first part is to do with taxes and the second to do with the role of governments in development.

First, I don't see any reason to try to get away from a monetized world economy. It doesn't seem a useful or achievable goal. Rather, I'd like to see the widespread adoption of tax structures more along the lines of the Swedish - from what I understand of it. I don't think there's anything wrong with the pursuit of fabulous wealth. If that's your thing, go for it. More power to you. However, there's something wrong with the way that pursuit works right now. Granted, people who have more money do pay more taxes, but not very consistently across countries. The wealthiest person in the world right now may be the Swedish founder of IKEA. However, he doesn't live in Sweden - to avoid paying the high taxes. Similarly, some US companies find themselves nice offshore offices in the Cayman Islands in which to situate their headquarters to avoid taxes. I'd like to see a simplification of tax systems within countries and a harmonization of sorts between them to make sure that the more money people or businesses have, the more taxes they pay. The harmonization is so that the wealthy can't simply hide their money elsewhere. In general, I'm of the opinion that - though there will surely be some losses due to inefficiency or corruption - governments should be raising more money. That's right, big government.

Why big government? Why more money? Well, it seems to me that right now the only system capable of handling the requisite reallocation of wealth from richer to poorer is the international system of sovereign states and its many apparatuses for interaction - the UN, WTO, BWIs, etc. I guess on some level I'm a fan of the old developmental state from the post-WWII era. What I'm really thinking about is a fundamental shift in the ideology of government towards a bigger role in guaranteeing the social welfare of people around the world, not just in their own countries. This would obviously be a bigger shift in some places than others. As I said above, I'm still struggling with how to articulate this properly. I'm certainly not advocating the overthrow of the capitalist system. Rather, I want to see governments (as the only institutions capable of carrying out such a massive coordination) take a strong role in ensuring the welfare of human beings on the planet. It seems like this is the logical outcome of globalization, whether MacDonald's, De Beers or Starbucks realizes that or not.

I'd certainly be interested in hearing anything anyone had to say about why this would never work, is misguided, or is the best thing since sliced bread. Start a discussion thread or send me something via the email form and I'll put it up on the opinion page.

James Makamba

March 30, 2004 - James Makamba.

A recent acquaintance of mine made me aware of the case of James Makamba after she noticed the 'Act' item on pressuring the US government to take action on Zimbabwe. I've posted some information and links on the Act page.

Mr. Makamba's case seems to be related more to the ability of the government to control foreign currency earnings than anything else. As noted in one of the pieces linked to on the Act page, Mr. Makamba has been on better footing with the government in the past.

As I observed to the doctoral student who alerted me to this case, the disaster in Zimbabwe becomes more real when you encounter someone directly affected by it. However, I wanted to start a sensitive discussion about Mr. Makamba's case, as a sort of disclaimer. He is not the typical example of suffering under Mugabe (i.e., a poor landless peasant finding it more and more difficult to get by). He is a wealthy businessman and former politician. His problem seems to be too much success, rather than danger of malnutrition. On the surface, he seems to have more in common with jailed Russian oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky.

As I've been reading so much at SOAS about the role of the state in economic development, development & modernization theory in general, and the role of capitalism in growth and development, it occurs to me as well that what Zimbabwe needs are more Mr. Makamba's starting businesses and creating growth - along the lines of the 'Africa's workers are not exploited enough' neo-marxist/neo-liberal tradition. It's clear enough that Mugabe isn't really concerned with running a developmental state in Zimbabwe. Are those like Mr. Makamba the hope for Zimbabwe's post-Mugabe economic future?